Chap. 4: Modal Empirical Adequacy

As explained in the introduction of Modal Empiricism, part of the debate on scientific realism concerns the aim of science: whether it is truth or something weaker, such as empirical adequacy. The aim of science should not be confused with the aim of individual scientists, which can be various: we are talking about the “rules of the game” of the scientific institution, and in particular, the criteria of acceptance and rejection of theories and hypotheses.

The fourth chapter of the book proposes such a criteria by examining what would count as ideal empirical success for a theory in science. The construction of this criteria is based on the account of scientific representation presented in chapter three, and I proceed by first examining ideal empirical success in all contexts at the level of models, then at the level of theories, taken to be families of models. The resulting criteria is modal empirical adequacy, and I argue that it fares better than van Fraassen’s notion of empirical adequacy when it comes to accounting for scientific practice.

Chap. 3: Contextual Use and Communal Norms

The second chapter of Modal Empiricism ended with the idea that there is a tension between the contextual aspects of experimentation and the unifying power of scientific theories. Both are important for an empiricist who wishes to pay attention to experience while maintaining that science is directed towards a unified aim. The third chapter of my book presents an account of epistemic representation that resolves this tension, and constitutes the framework for the analyses of the rest of the book.

Note that although I will mostly use scientific example, this account could apply to any kind of epistemic representation, for example, city maps.

Chap. 2: Theories, Models and Representation

Before inquiring into the aim and achievements of science, it is worth being clear on the nature of one of its main products, scientific theories. The second chapter of Modal Empiricism reviews how the way philosophers have conceived of theories has evolved in time.

Introduction: The Debates on Scientific Realism

What Is at Stake With Scientific Realism?

When asked what we know about, say, combustion phenomena, or living organisms, it is natural to turn to science (in these cases chemistry or biology) for an answer. As can be read in chemistry textbooks, combustion involves reactions where big molecules break into smaller ones and release energy, for example. One could think that science provides an understanding of these phenomena because scientific theories literally describe what exists in the world, because they unveil the nature of reality. This is roughly what the doctrine of scientific realism says.

On the surface of it, scientific realism looks like nothing but common-sense trust in the capacity of science to give us knowledge and understanding. This attitude can, of course, be qualified (only mature theories are concerned, for example), but a general distrust that would concern all of science could seem misplaced, and indeed, scientific realism is often used in the philosophical literature as a mark of seriousness.

However, as I explain in the introduction of Modal Empiricism, I think that such a surface reading of the debate, which places anti-realism in an uncomfortable position, is inaccurate. An anti-realist does not necessarily put into question the capacity of science to produce knowledge. It rather challenges the realist interpretation of science. Is science really concerned with the deep nature of reality? Or is it concerned with something more practical and mundane? Is there really more to explanations and understanding than the functions they play in our interactions with the world? In sum, I believe that the debate on scientific realism is more accurately framed as a debate over the interpretation of science than as a debate about trust versus scepticism.

My aim, in my book, is to present and defend an anti-realist interpretation of science, Modal Empiricism. Empiricist positions are often characterised as the idea that theories do not aim at being true, but merely aim at “saving the phenomena”. As a first approach, modal empiricism can be understood as the idea that theories aim at saving the possible phenomena. This is, so to speak, a reinforced version of empiricism. However, in light of what has just been said, this position should not be understood as a mere form of scepticism in contrast with realism. I take modal empiricism to be the precise articulation of a pragmatist stance towards science, a stance that puts practice at the centre of interpretational issues.

Before saying more about modal empiricism, let us examine the multiple facets of the debate on scientific realism.