Chap. 3: Contextual Use and Communal Norms

The second chapter of Modal Empiricism ended with the idea that there is a tension between the contextual aspects of experimentation and the unifying power of scientific theories. Both are important for an empiricist who wishes to pay attention to experience while maintaining that science is directed towards a unified aim. The third chapter of my book presents an account of epistemic representation that resolves this tension, and constitutes the framework for the analyses of the rest of the book.

Note that although I will mostly use scientific example, this account could apply to any kind of epistemic representation, for example, city maps.

Chap. 2: Theories, Models and Representation

Before inquiring into the aim and achievements of science, it is worth being clear on the nature of one of its main products, scientific theories. The second chapter of Modal Empiricism reviews how the way philosophers have conceived of theories has evolved in time.

Introduction: The Debates on Scientific Realism

What Is at Stake With Scientific Realism?

When asked what we know about, say, combustion phenomena, or living organisms, it is natural to turn to science (in these cases chemistry or biology) for an answer. As can be read in chemistry textbooks, combustion involves reactions where big molecules break into smaller ones and release energy, for example. One could think that science provides an understanding of these phenomena because scientific theories literally describe what exists in the world, because they unveil the nature of reality. This is roughly what the doctrine of scientific realism says.

On the surface of it, scientific realism looks like nothing but common-sense trust in the capacity of science to give us knowledge and understanding. This attitude can, of course, be qualified (only mature theories are concerned, for example), but a general distrust that would concern all of science could seem misplaced, and indeed, scientific realism is often used in the philosophical literature as a mark of seriousness.

However, as I explain in the introduction of Modal Empiricism, I think that such a surface reading of the debate, which places anti-realism in an uncomfortable position, is inaccurate. An anti-realist does not necessarily put into question the capacity of science to produce knowledge. It rather challenges the realist interpretation of science. Is science really concerned with the deep nature of reality? Or is it concerned with something more practical and mundane? Is there really more to explanations and understanding than the functions they play in our interactions with the world? In sum, I believe that the debate on scientific realism is more accurately framed as a debate over the interpretation of science than as a debate about trust versus scepticism.

My aim, in my book, is to present and defend an anti-realist interpretation of science, Modal Empiricism. Empiricist positions are often characterised as the idea that theories do not aim at being true, but merely aim at “saving the phenomena”. As a first approach, modal empiricism can be understood as the idea that theories aim at saving the possible phenomena. This is, so to speak, a reinforced version of empiricism. However, in light of what has just been said, this position should not be understood as a mere form of scepticism in contrast with realism. I take modal empiricism to be the precise articulation of a pragmatist stance towards science, a stance that puts practice at the centre of interpretational issues.

Before saying more about modal empiricism, let us examine the multiple facets of the debate on scientific realism.

Modal Empiricism: book publication this year

I am under contract with Springer Nature to publish a book based on my PhD thesis next year. I will publish in this blog an accessible summary of every chapter. The book itself is an english version of my thesis. It is a condensed, shorter version (because the thesis included a much more comprehensive review of the literature, as well as more programmatic chapters), and also an updated version: a lot of my work got published in academic journals, which means that I have received lots of comments from reviewers. I have also done a lot of research on scientific representation since the end of my PhD, which helped refine my views substantially. In sum, this book is a better version of my PhD thesis. I am very excited by this, and I hope many of you will read it and enjoy it!